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PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: HOW ENDREW F.
COULD AFFECT STRUGGLING SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Michael S. Morgan*
“The determination of when handicapped children are receiving
sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the
[Individuals with Disabilities Education Act] presents a more
difficult problem.”1
– Justice Rehnquist, June 28, 1982
“That ‘more difficult problem’ is before us today.”2
– Chief Justice Roberts, March 22, 2017
I.

INTRODUCTION

Speaking at his granddaughter’s high school graduation in Virginia, the
late Justice Scalia offered the class of 2010 simple, yet thoughtful advice.3
“Movement is not necessarily progress,” the Justice explained.4 “More
important than your obligation to follow your conscience, or at least prior to
it, is your obligation to form your conscience correctly.”5 Justice Scalia
concluded his speech by offering his audience some candid guidance: “Good
intentions are not enough.”6
*

J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; Dual B.A., summa cum laude,
2016, Seton Hall University. I would like to thank Professor Amy Newcombe for her
invaluable feedback and assistance with the writing of this Comment. I am also grateful to
Professors Claudette St. Romain & John Kip Cornwell for their genuine advice and guidance
throughout law school. To my rock, Tiffani Mathikolonis, thank you for your unwavering
love and support through thick and thin. To my parents, Stew and Kathy Morgan, thank you
for your decades of dedication to a profession awfully undervalued. This Comment is
dedicated to my soon-to-be-retired mother, whose years of teaching special education has
bettered the lives of countless students with disabilities. You are proof that a single teacher
can make all the difference.
1 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982).
2 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017).
3 Kat Miller, Scalia Schools Other Commencement Addresses in His, WASH. TIMES
(June 18, 2010), https://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/watercooler/2010/jun/18/scaliaschools-other-commencement-addresses-his/.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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Less than one year after Justice Scalia passed away,7 on January 17,
2017 the surviving eight Justices heard oral argument8 for the case of Endrew
F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1.9 The issue seemed relatively
straightforward: how much educational “benefit” should public schools be
required to provide to disabled students covered by the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?10 Finding an acceptable answer,
however, proved to be more difficult. Indeed, Justice Alito—the son of two
public school teachers11—captured this difficulty with a simple remark:
“What is frustrating about this case and about [the IDEA] is that we have a
blizzard of words,” Justice Alito said.12 “[W]hat everybody seems to be
looking for is the word that has just the right nuance to express this
thought.”13 The “thought” to which Justice Alito alluded concerned just how
much the federal government should demand of its public schools.14
Throughout oral argument, the Court as a whole seemed bothered by
the standard predominately used by the circuit courts—bothered that a
modest “some benefit” standard was sufficient to satisfy the substantive
requirement of the IDEA.15 But several Justices—both liberal and
conservative—also showed an uneasiness about the possible financial
burden that a change to the standard might impose on public schools.16 “[I]s
there any place to discuss the cost that . . . would be incurred for, say,
severely disabled students?” Justice Kennedy asked.17 Justice Breyer shared
this concern. “[T]he problem that’s working in my mind is if we suddenly
adopt a new standard, all over the country we’ll have judges and lawyers . . .
interpreting it differently,” Justice Breyer worried.18 “I foresee taking the
money that ought to go to the children,” he cautioned, “and spending it on
lawsuits and lawyers and all kinds of things that are extraneous.”19 It was
7 Justice Scalia passed away on February 13, 2016. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia,
Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
8 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
9 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
10 Id. at 997–98.
11 THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-2012, at 499 (Clare
Cushman ed., 3d ed. 2013).
12 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 47.
13 Id.
14 See id. at 47–48.
15 See generally id.; see also Adam Liptak, Justices Face “Blizzard of Words” in Special
Education Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politic
s/supreme-court-special-education.html.
16 See Liptak, supra note 15.
17 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 9.
18 Id. at 14.
19 Id. at 15.
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again Justice Alito, however, who neatly summarized the Court’s hesitancy
with one question: “No matter how expensive it would be and no matter what
the impact in . . . a poor school district would be on the general student
population, cost can’t be considered?”20
That is undoubtedly a loaded question, as this Comment will
demonstrate. It must first be noted, though, that the purpose of this Comment
is not to criticize the (unquestionably) good intentions underlying Endrew F.
Rather, this Comment aims to highlight the potential consequences of that
decision, which may be overshadowed by those good intentions. More
specifically, this Comment will examine how struggling school districts may
suffer under Endrew F.’s heightened educational standard. Part II will
discuss the historical development of special education law in the United
States, culminating with the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA), and its successor, the IDEA. Students covered by
the IDEA are entitled to a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), but
what exactly constitutes a FAPE has been a matter of controversy for quite
some time.21 While school districts must provide disabled students with an
individualized education program (“IEP”) that details the students’ required
special education and related services, disputes arise when parents disagree
with schools as to what those IEPs should require.22 Part III will discuss the
circuit split that emerged in the wake of Board of Education of Hendrick
Hudson Central School District v. Rowley,23 the landmark special education
case preceding Endrew F. Part IV will provide an analysis of Endrew F.,
examining the Supreme Court’s decision to reject the “some benefit”
standard and replace it with one “markedly more demanding.”24 Part V will
evaluate how Endrew F.’s new standard, although crafted with the best
intentions, may nonetheless overburden struggling school districts. Part VI
will briefly conclude.

20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 27.
DEREK BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 504 (2016).
Id.
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. Mental Health Reform’s “Bold New Approach”
On January 20, 1961, nearly one million spectators gathered before the
Capitol Building to watch a youthful, charismatic “Catholic boy” sworn in
as the thirty-fifth President of the United States.25 The inauguration of fortythree-year-old President John F. Kennedy signaled a breath of fresh air for a
generation exhausted by war. And while the Cold War necessitated that
foreign policy remained the core priority of his administration, President
Kennedy’s familial connection to mental disability suggested that mental
health reform would be an important part of the New Frontier.26 Indeed, less
than nine months after his inauguration, on October 17, 1961, President
Kennedy appointed the President’s Panel on Mental Retardation, a twentyseven-member panel comprised of “outstanding scientists, doctors, and
others.”27 The panel’s task was straightforward, yet daunting: develop a
national plan to combat deficiencies in mental health treatment.28
Only one year later, on October 16, 1962, the panel presented its report
to the President, providing over one hundred recommendations regarding
methods of research, treatment, and education.29 In light of the panel’s
report, on February 5, 1963, President Kennedy issued a “Special Message
to the Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation,” urging Congress
to take “a bold new approach” toward mental health reform.30 His particular
plea for special education was clear:
I am asking the Office of Education to place a new emphasis on
research in the learning process, expedite the application of
research findings to teaching methods for the mentally retarded,
25 The Inauguration of John F. Kennedy, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. &
MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Exhibits/Permanent-Exhibits/The-Inauguration-ofPresident-Kennedy.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
26 See John F. Kennedy and People with Intellectual Disabilities, JOHN F. KENNEDY
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/JFK-andPeople-with-Intellectual-Disabilities.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) [hereinafter John F.
Kennedy and People with Intellectual Disabilities]. President Kennedy’s younger sister,
Rosemary, was born in 1918 with a mental disability. Id. In 1946, President Kennedy’s
father, Joseph, along with his mother, Rose, established the Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Foundation,
“in memory of their eldest son” who had been killed in action during World War II. Id. The
Foundation sought to improve awareness and treatment of those with mental disabilities, and
was overseen by President Kennedy’s other sister, Eunice Kennedy Shriver. Id. Eunice was
instrumental in pushing mental health reform as a priority of President Kennedy’s
administration. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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support studies on improvement of curricula, develop teaching
aids, and stimulate the training of special [education] teachers.31
Eight months later, on October 24, 1963, Congress passed the Maternal and
Child Health and Mental Retardation Planning Amendment to the Social
Security Act.32 It was considered the first major piece of legislation aimed
towards mental health reform.33 Only one week after, on October 31, 1963,
President Kennedy signed into law the Community Mental Health Act,
which provided funding for the establishment of mental health facilities
focused on the treatment and care of people with mental disabilities.34 This
bill, however, would be the last piece of legislation President Kennedy
signed into law—he was assassinated just three weeks later.35 But the
assassination of President Kennedy would not curb the progress he had
started toward mental health reform. Befittingly, the President’s brother,
Robert Kennedy, would rejuvenate the effort toward improved awareness of
those with mental disabilities.36
In the autumn of 1965, two years after his brother’s death, Senator
Robert Kennedy made an unexpected visit to the infamous Willowbrook
State School, touring the children’s psychiatric institution and publicly
equating it to a “snake pit.”37 While testifying before the Joint Legislative
Committee on Mental Health Retardation and Physical Handicap in
September 1965, Senator Kennedy endeavored to steer public attention
toward the decrepit conditions that had for decades plagued psychiatric
institutions.38 On the heels of Senator Kennedy’s commentary, then-Boston
University Professor Burton Blatt, along with photographer Fred Kaplan,
visited several psychiatric institutions in December 1965.39
The
environments they encountered at these various institutions motivated the
duo to document their experiences in Christmas in Purgatory: A

31 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1933-1973, at 1548
(Robert H. Bremner et al. eds., 1974).
32 John F. Kennedy and People with Intellectual Disabilities, supra note 26.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 President Kennedy, just forty-six years old, was assassinated in Dallas, Texas on
November 22, 1963. DeeNeen Brown, The Day John F. Kennedy Was Killed: How America
Mourned a Fallen President, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/26/how-america-mourned-john-f-kennedy-images-of-grief-fora-fallen-president/?utm_term=.878e24e821ec.
36 See PAUL J. CASTELLANI, FROM SNAKE PITS TO CASH COWS: POLITICS AND PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS IN NEW YORK 117 (2005).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 118.
39 Steven J. Taylor, Christmas in Purgatory: A Retrospective Look, 44 AM. ASS’N ON
MENTAL RETARDATION 145, 145 (2006).
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Photographic Essay on Mental Retardation,40 which brought photographic
recognition to the ignored world of mental disability. Indeed, the latter half
of the 1960s ushered in a new era of collective mindfulness regarding mental
disability and soon spurred advancement in special education at the turn of
the decade.41
Prior to the 1970s, public schools routinely closed their doors to
students with disabilities, depriving them of a proper education by
segregating them from the general student population.42 But this notion of
segregation-in-education came under fire in 1954, after a unanimous
Supreme Court “conclude[d] that in the field of public education the doctrine
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”43 The Court in Brown v. Board of
Education established the right to equal educational opportunity and set a
precedent against racial segregation in public education.44 The landmark
decision, however, would improve more than just the educational
opportunities of students from racial minorities. Indeed, proponents of
students with disabilities used Brown’s reasoning in advocating that disabled
students should have the same access to education as nondisabled students.45
Change in special education law came shortly thereafter, driven by two
seminal decisions: Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC)
v. Pennsylvania,46 and Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia.47
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children challenged the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s statutory-exclusion of mentally disabled
students from public schools.48 The Court in PARC held that mentally
disabled students could not be denied access to a free and adequate public
education, establishing the precedent that would be used to dismantle
exclusionary education laws in other states.49 Only one year later, in 1972,
Mills took that precedent one step further. The Court in Mills extended
PARC’s doctrine to not just mentally disabled students, but to all disabled
students.50 These two cases put Washington on notice, and shortly thereafter

40 BURTON BLATT & FRED KAPLAN, CHRISTMAS IN PURGATORY: A PHOTOGRAPHIC ESSAY
ON MENTAL RETARDATION (1974).
41 See Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
42 BLACK, supra note 21, at 469.
43 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
44 See id. at 495–96.
45 BLACK, supra note 21, at 469.
46 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
47 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
48 BLACK, supra note 21, at 469.
49 Id.
50 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878; see also BLACK, supra note 21, at 469.
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Congress opened an investigation into the state of special education.51
The findings were sobering. Congress discovered that millions of
disabled children were being poorly educated, if at all.52 Indeed, as revealed
by the Senate Report that later accompanied the EAHCA, it was estimated
that
of the more than 8 million children (between birth and twenty-one
years of age) with handicapping conditions requiring special
education and related services, only 3.9 million such children
[were] receiving an appropriate education.
1.75 million
handicapped children [were] receiving no educational services at
all, and 2.5 million handicapped children [were] receiving an
inappropriate education.53
In light of these findings, Congress shifted its attention toward statutory
reform for students with disabilities.54 Accordingly, in 1975 Congress
passed—and President Ford reluctantly signed into law55—the 142nd piece
of legislation of the 94th Congress: the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act.56 “Incorporat[ing] the major principles of the right to
51

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 194 (1982).
S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975).
53 Id.
54 BLACK, supra note 21, at 470.
55 Statement on Signing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5413 (last visited
Mar. 29, 2018). The following is an excerpt from President Ford’s official statement on
signing the EAHCA on December 2, 1975:
Unfortunately, this bill promises more than the Federal Government can
deliver, and its good intentions could be thwarted by the many unwise
provisions it contains. Everyone can agree with the objective stated in the title
of this bill—educating all handicapped children in our Nation. The key
question is whether the bill will really accomplish that objective. Even the
strongest supporters of this measure know as well as I that they are falsely
raising the expectations of the groups affected by claiming authorization levels
which are excessive and unrealistic. Despite my strong support for full
educational opportunities for our handicapped children, the funding levels
proposed in this bill will simply not be possible if Federal expenditures are to
be brought under control and a balanced budget achieved over the next few
years. There are other features in the bill which I believe to be objectionable
and which should be changed. It contains a vast array of detailed, complex,
and costly administrative requirements which would unnecessarily assert
Federal control over traditional State and local government functions. It
establishes complex requirements under which tax dollars would be used to
support administrative paperwork and not educational programs.
Unfortunately, these requirements will remain in effect even though the
Congress appropriates far less than the amounts contemplated in [the
EAHCA].
Id.
56 Timothy Ilg & Charles Russo, Funding Special Education and the IDEA: Promises,
Promises, in MONEY, POLITICS, AND LAW: INTERSECTIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE PROVISION
52
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education cases,”57 the EAHCA required all schools receiving federal
funding to provide a FAPE to all disabled children covered by the Act.58 In
1990, the EAHCA was retitled as the IDEA, but its substantive and
procedural protections remained practically the same.59
B. The IDEA: How Does it Work?
Under the IDEA, states must adhere to certain procedural and
substantive requirements in exchange for federal funding toward the excess
costs of special education.60 First, school districts must determine whether a
student is eligible under the IDEA.61 Despite references to “all children with
disabilities” in common law rhetoric and legislative history, not all disabled
children are, in fact, eligible under the IDEA.62 Instead, the IDEA defines
an eligible child as one “(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments
(including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . orthopedic
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or
specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special
education and related services.”63 In other words, eligibility under the IDEA
requires that a child: (1) have a type of disability enumerated in the IDEA
that “adversely affects [the] child’s educational performance,” and (2) need
“special education” and “related services” as a result of that disability.64
The IDEA defines “special education” as “specially designed
instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,
including . . . instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in
hospitals and institutions, and in other settings; and . . . instruction in
physical education.”65 Furthermore, “related services” are defined as
“transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
57

101 (Karen DeMoss & Kenneth Wong eds., 2004).
S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 n.2

(1982).
58

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012).
See Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through
IDEA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
60 BLACK, supra note 21, at 471.
61 Id. at 501–02.
62 Id.
63 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).
64 BLACK, supra note 21, at 471; see also 34 C.F.R § 300.8(c) (2017).
65 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29); see also BLACK, supra note 21, at 471 (“The IDEA defines
‘special education’ as the adaptation of the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction
to address a child’s unique needs and to ensure access to the general curriculum.”) (citing 34
C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(3)).
59
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from special education . . . .”66 Such services may include “speech-language
pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological
services, physical and occupational therapy, . . . therapeutic recreation,
social work services, . . . rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility
services, and medical services . . . .”67 Not all children with an enumerated
disability, however, qualify under this two-prong prerequisite. For example,
a child with spina bifada may require catheterization services, or a child with
cystic fibrosis may require respiratory therapy, but such services would not
qualify as “special education” unless the disability adversely affected the
child’s educational performance.68 Put simply, if a child needs “related
services” but not “special education,” then that child is not eligible under the
IDEA.69
Once a child is deemed eligible under the IDEA, the school district has
an affirmative obligation to create an IEP for the child, which must be
specifically tailored to provide the child with a FAPE.70 The IEP is the
linchpin of the child’s educational curriculum; it is the mechanism through
which the majority of IDEA-services operate.71 As Professor Derek Black72
explains, the IEP “is the basic plan of education for the child,” and must
incorporate the child’s “current educational performance, annual goals and
short-term objectives, the extent to which the child can take part in general
education, the date services are to begin and how long they will be offered,
and the criteria to evaluate whether the student is achieving his or her
goals.”73 Arguably the most important—and most contentious—issue
involving the creation of an IEP is whether it provides the child with a FAPE.
The child’s IEP must be uniquely constructed to provide the child with
a FAPE.74 The IDEA defines FAPE as “special education” and “related
services” which: “[(1)] have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge; [(2)] meet the standards of
the State educational agency; [(3)] include an appropriate . . . education in
the State involved; and [(4)] are provided in conformity with the [child’s
66

20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).
Id.
68 BLACK, supra note 21, at 472.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 501.
71 Id. at 503.
72 Derek Black is a Professor of Law at the University of South Carolina School of Law.
David Hopper, Derek Black, South Carolina University—Federal Education Right, ACAD.
MINUTE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://academicminute.org/2018/02/derek-black-south-carolinauniversity-federal-education-right/ (explaining that “[t]he focus of [Professor Black’s] current
scholarship is the intersection of constitutional law and public education, particularly as it
pertains to educational equality and fairness for disadvantaged students”).
73 BLACK, supra note 21, at 503; see generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2012).
74 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
67
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IEP].”75 A federal circuit split emerged, however, as to what constituted an
appropriate education; indeed, the term was as ambiguous as it was
ambitious. This statutory language created a hotbed of inconsistent
jurisprudence and eventually grabbed the Supreme Court’s attention in the
autumn of 1981.76 One year later, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve
the issue in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School
District v. Rowley.77
C. The Stakes of Special Education: All Roads Lead to Rowley
In 1982, the Court in Rowley addressed the issue as to when an
education is sufficiently “appropriate” to satisfy the FAPE requirement
under the IDEA.78 Plaintiff Amy Rowley was a first-grade student at
Furnace Woods School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District of
New York.79 Rowley had a hearing impairment, and as a result, she was
offered an IEP that required she be educated in a regular classroom and
receive additional instruction from both a special tutor for the deaf and a
speech therapist.80 The school district proposed that Rowley’s regular
classroom instructor speak through a wireless transmitter, which would
amplify the instructor’s voice by means of a hearing aid worn by Rowley.81
Rowley’s parents, however, insisted that the school district instead provide
an interpreter in all of Rowley’s classes.82 The school district refused, and
Rowley’s parents subsequently sought administrative review before an
independent examiner.83 The examiner found an interpreter to be
unnecessary because Rowley “was achieving educationally, academically,
and socially without such assistance.”84 In response, Rowley’s parents filed
a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, claiming that the school’s
refusal to provide an interpreter had denied Rowley a FAPE under the
IDEA.85

75

Id. § 1401(9) (emphasis added).
See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
77 Id.
78 Id. Rowley involved an analysis of the IDEA’s statutory precursor, the EAHCA. Id.
Still, the same textual language has predominately carried over to today’s version of the
IDEA. Compare id. at 187–89 (quoting EAHCA definitions), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9),
(26), (29) (current IDEA definitions).
79 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 185.
84 Id.
85 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185–86.
76

MORGAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

3/4/2019 6:52 PM

COMMENT

787

The District Court agreed with Rowley’s parents, finding that Rowley
had, in fact, been denied a FAPE.86 The District Court held that Rowley’s
education was not “appropriate” unless it afforded her “an opportunity to
achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to
other children.”87 A divided Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the pressing question of what constituted a
FAPE under the IDEA.88 In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Rehnquist,
the Court established a twofold assessment to determine whether a school
had provided a FAPE: (1) the school must “compl[y] with the procedures set
forth in the [IDEA]”; and (2) the IEP must be “reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits.”89 If these two requirements
were met, the Court reasoned, then the school district had fulfilled its
obligation under the IDEA—“courts [could] require no more.”90 Finding
that Rowley’s IEP was reasonably calculated to provide her with an
educational benefit, the Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit.91
In doing so, however, the Court inadvertently92 set the standard for what
constituted “appropriate education” under the IDEA: an IEP must be
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive an educational benefit.93
Yet, “[t]he determination of when handicapped children are receiving
sufficient educational benefits,” the Court acknowledged, “present[ed] a
more difficult problem.”94
Indeed, inconsistencies emerged among the federal circuits regarding
interpretation of the phrase “educational benefit.”95 Some courts interpreted
Rowley as requiring no more than “some educational benefit,”96 whereas
other courts interpreted the decision as demanding a heightened “meaningful
educational benefit.”97 The distinction was significant because schools were
86

Id.
Id. at 186.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 206–07.
90 Id.
91 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210.
92 Id. at 202 (“The [IDEA] requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of
handicapped children . . . . It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the
spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with
infinite variations in between. . . . We do not attempt today to establish any one
test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children
covered by the [IDEA].”).
93 Id. at 206–07.
94 Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
95 See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of
How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1–4 (2009) (discussing the
differences among the federal circuits in applying the Rowley standard).
96 BLACK, supra note 21, at 511.
97 Id.
87
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frequently involved in litigation regarding their obligations under the
IDEA.98 One of the most contested issues concerned whether parents were
entitled to tuition reimbursement for private schooling when the reason for
withdrawing their child from public school was the public school’s alleged
failure to provide the child with a FAPE.99 In 1993, the Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Florence County School District Four v. Carter.100
The Court’s decision in Carter established a parental right to tuition
reimbursement, even when parents “unilaterally withdraw their child from a
public school that provides an inappropriate public education under [the]
IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an education that is
otherwise proper under [the] IDEA.”101
While the IDEA made noteworthy progress in terms of educating
children with disabilities, Congress realized that it needed to do more to
“improv[e] the quality of services . . . and transitional results . . . obtained by
[disabled] students.”102 Accordingly, Congress twice reauthorized and
amended the IDEA, first in 1997 and again in 2004.103 Ironically, however,
these amendments all but confirmed that Congress knew the IDEA was
drastically underfunded, yet intended to wash its hands of the responsibility
regardless. When Congress originally passed the EAHCA, it agreed to fund
forty percent of the national average per-pupil expenditure by 1982.104 That
is, Congress promised to pay forty percent of the “excess costs” associated
with educating students with disabilities.105 But once Congress realized that
it could never satisfy that threshold, it later amended the IDEA, changing the
forty percent figure to a “maximum funding goal, rather than a
requirement.”106 As such, Congress openly acknowledged its inability to
pull its own weight, shifting the burden onto states and their local school
districts. Indeed, aside from a “multiyear boost” linked to the federal
stimulus package in 2009, for the past forty-two years Congress has
repeatedly failed to even come close to its forty percent benchmark.107 As
of 2017, the federal government covered only sixteen percent of the costs
98

Id. at 545.
Id.
100 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
101 Id. at 9.
102 S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 14 (1996); see also S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 6 (2003).
103 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37; see also Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647.
104 Christina A. Samuels, Decades of Progress, Challenges Under Federal Special
Education Law, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/11/
11/decades-of-progress-challenges-under-federal-special.html.
105 Id.
106 Id. (emphasis added).
107 Id.
99
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associated with the IDEA.108
Nonetheless, five years after the IDEA’s latest amendment, the
Supreme Court further stretched the IDEA’s scope in Forest Grove School
District v. T. A.109 There, the Court determined whether the amended-IDEA
prohibited tuition reimbursement where a child did not first receive “special
education and related services” from the public school.110 Writing for the
6-3 majority, Justice Stevens concluded that the “IDEA authorizes
reimbursement for the cost of private special-education services when a
school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is
appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special
education or related services through the public school.”111
The dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Scalia, and Thomas, emphasized
that the IDEA was envisioned to promote collaboration between parents and
school districts toward a mutual goal: an appropriate education for the
disabled child.112 Writing for the dissent, Justice Souter sympathized with
the concerns of school districts, because “special education can be
immensely expensive, amounting to tens of billions of dollars annually and
as much as [twenty percent] of public schools’ general operating budgets.”113
“Given the burden of private school placement,” Justice Souter reasoned, “it
makes good sense to require parents to try to devise a satisfactory alternative
within the public schools.”114 This fiscal controversy has generated a clash
between parents of students with disabilities and struggling school
districts—one that federal circuits have grappled with differently in the
thirty-five years following Rowley.

108

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION 4 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget17/summary/17
summary.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET SUMMARY].
109 557 U.S. 230 (2009).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 247.
112 Id. at 249–60.
113 Id. at 258.
114 Id. at 260.
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE WAKE OF ROWLEY
A. Tale of Two Standards: “Some Benefit” or “Meaningful Benefit”
Ever since Rowley, the requirement for providing a FAPE has been
interpreted differently among the federal circuits.115 Some circuit courts
have applied a “some educational benefit” standard,116 while others have
applied a “meaningful educational benefit” standard.117 While some scholars
have disagreed as to which standard has been the majority approach,118 both
interpretations were borne out of Rowley’s majority opinion.119 The circuit
courts that used the “some benefit” standard drew their understanding from
the passage in Rowley which states: “implicit in the congressional purpose
of providing access to a ‘free appropriate public education’ is the
requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to
confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.”120
Conversely, those circuit courts that used the “meaningful benefit” standard
derived their interpretation from the following passage: “in seeking to
provide such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the
States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary
to make such access meaningful.”121 This subtle difference in interpretation,
however, sharply divided the federal circuits.
B. The Best of Times (Allegedly): The “Meaningful Benefit” Standard
The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits utilized the
“meaningful benefit” standard, interpreting Rowley as requiring schools to
provide an IEP reasonably calculated to provide the student with a
“meaningful” educational benefit. In Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of
Education,122 the Second Circuit explicitly held that “[w]hile the [IDEA]

115
116

See Wenkart, supra note 95, at 1–4.
See, e.g., Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.

2008).
117

See, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elem. Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2008).
Compare Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Evan Blewett, When Good Is No Longer Good
Enough: How the High Stakes Nature of the No Child Left Behind Act Supplanted the Rowley
Definition of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 41 J. L. & EDUC. 5, 20–21 (2012) (finding
that case law indicates that the majority of circuit courts adhere to the “some educational
benefit” standard), with Scott Goldschmidt, A New Idea for Special-Education Law:
Resolving the “Appropriate” Educational Benefit Circuit Split and Ensuring a Meaningful
Education for Students with Disabilities, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2011) (stating “a
slight majority” of circuits require “a heightened-educational-benefit standard,” also known
as the “meaningful educational benefit” standard).
119 See generally Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
120 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
122 103 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1997).
118
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does not authorize a court to impose a particular substantive educational
standard on the state or to require equality of opportunity for the handicapped
in education . . . a state IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide some
‘meaningful’ benefit.”123 The Second Circuit reaffirmed this stance in Cerra
v. Pawling Central School District,124 finding that public schools satisfied
their FAPE requirements when they offered an IEP that was “likely to
produce progress, not regression,” and afforded disabled students “with an
opportunity greater than mere ‘trivial advancement.’”125
In Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate, the Third Circuit found
that the IDEA was “inten[ded] to afford more than a trivial amount of
educational benefit” to students with disabilities.126 Cautioning against the
interpretation of Rowley where “the conferral of any benefit, no matter how
small, [would] qualify as ‘appropriate education’ under the [IDEA],” the
Third Circuit instead found that the IDEA required “an education that would
confer meaningful benefit” upon students with disabilities.127 The Fifth
Circuit in Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District v. Michael F.
echoed this rationale.128 While recognizing that “the IDEA guarantees only
a ‘basic floor of opportunity’ for every disabled child,” the Fifth Circuit
found that the IDEA required an educational benefit more than “mere
modicum or de minimis.”129 Citing with approval the Third Circuit’s
decision in Polk, the Fifth Circuit held that “the educational benefit [] an IEP
is designed to achieve must be ‘meaningful.’”130 In Deal v. Hamilton County
Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit held that “the IDEA require[d] an IEP
to confer a ‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in relation to the
potential of the child at issue.”131 And the Ninth Circuit, in N.B. v. Hellgate
Elementary School District,132 interpreted the amendments to the IDEA as
requiring schools to “provide a student with a ‘meaningful benefit’ in order
to satisfy the substantive requirements of the IDEA.”133 These federal
circuits plainly interpreted Rowley as requiring schools to provide a
“meaningful” educational benefit to disabled students covered by the IDEA.

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 1120.
427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 195.
853 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 184.
118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 248.
Id.
392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004).
541 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1213.
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C. The Worst of Times (Allegedly): The “Some Benefit” Standard
The First, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits utilized
the “some benefit” standard, interpreting Rowley as requiring schools to
provide an IEP reasonably calculated to provide the student with “some”
educational benefit. In Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School
District,134 the First Circuit diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Hellgate, finding that the amendments to the IDEA did not supplant the
“some benefit” standard adopted in Rowley.135 Plaintiff Stephanie Lessard
had been “diagnosed with moderate mental retardation . . . cognitive delays,
speech impairments, a seizure disorder . . . and partial paralysis of her left
side.”136 Lessard’s IEP included, among other things, a customary reading
program designed to increase her literary proficiency.137 Lessard’s parents,
however, advocated for a more specialized program,138 one that had been
recommended by their daughter’s personal psycholinguist.139 The school
declined to adopt the parent’s proposal because its employees were not
qualified under the suggested educational methodology.140
While Lessard’s parents “[did] not contest that [Lessard] was the
beneficiary of a standard, multisensory reading methodology,” they
nonetheless claimed that their daughter’s reading program “produced a level
of progress . . . beneath what [she] was capable of attaining.”141 The First
Circuit ruled in favor of the school district, finding that “an inquiring court
ought not to condemn [a chosen] methodology ex post merely because the
disabled child’s progress [did] not meet the parents’ . . . expectations.”142
Finding that the 1997 amendment to the IDEA did not supplant Rowley, the
First Circuit held that in order to satisfy the IDEA’s substantive requirement,
“[a]n IEP need only supply ‘some educational benefit,’ not an optimal or an
ideal level of educational benefit.”143
Similarly, in O.S. v. Fairfax County School Board,144 the Fourth Circuit
declined to find that Congress annulled Rowley by means of the IDEA’s 2004
amendment.145 “Without any express acknowledgment of [Congressional]
intent to . . . abrogate[] Supreme Court precedent[,]” the Fourth Circuit
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

518 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lessard, 518 F.3d at 21.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 23.
804 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 360.
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rejected the contention that a “meaningful benefit” standard had replaced the
“some benefit” standard originally set forth in Rowley.146 As such, the
Fourth Circuit reiterated the unmistakable standard within its jurisdiction: “a
school provides a FAPE so long as a child receives some educational benefit,
meaning a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial.”147
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke
148
P. endorsed the “some benefit” standard used by its sister circuits. The
decision, however, ultimately drew strong criticism in the wake of its
author’s future Supreme Court confirmation hearing.149 Plaintiff Luke’s
parents sought tuition reimbursement after they withdrew their autistic child
from a Colorado public school and placed him in a Massachusetts private
residential program that specialized in educating children with autism.150
Although Luke had made recognizable progress in public school from
kindergarten through second grade, at home he developed severe behavioral
problems that soon carried over into the public setting.151 Understandably
concerned, Luke’s parents explored residential options for their son, and
settled on the Boston Higashi School (“BHS”).152 Under BHS’s program,
Luke lived on the BHS campus for forty-four weeks of the year, and was
supervised by BHS educators and staff for twenty-four hours a day.153 In
response to a request for tuition reimbursement by Luke’s parents, the public
school offered Luke a final, revised IEP that “incorporated virtually all of
146

Id.
Id.
148 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008).
149 Senator Dick Durbin questioned Justice Gorsuch, the author of the Thompson decision,
about why he had “rejected not only the judgment of the federal district court, but also the
judgment of a hearing officer and the Colorado State administrative law judge.” Valerie
Strauss, Why the Word ‘Merely’ Turned Many Advocates For Students With Disabilities
Against Gorsuch, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer
-sheet/wp/2017/04/07/why-the-word-merely-turned-many-advocates-for-students-with-disa
bilities-against-gorsuch/?utm_term=.a1d73fec8545. After quoting language from Endrew
F.’s superseding decision, which ironically was handed down on the third day of Justice
Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, Senator Durbin pushed Justice Gorsuch with the following
question: “why in your early decision did you want to lower the bar so low to merely more
than de minimis as a standard for public education to meet [the] federal requirement under the
[IDEA]?” Id. A somber Justice Gorsuch replied, “[i]f anyone is suggesting that I like a result
where an autistic child happens to lose, that’s a heartbreaking accusation to me.
Heartbreaking. But the fact of the matter is I was bound by circuit precedent and so was the
panel of my court.” Nikita Vladimirov, Gorsuch: I’m ‘Sorry’ For Ruling Against Autistic
Student, HILL (Mar. 22, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/325318-gorsuch-i-waswrong-to-rule-against-autistic-student. The Justice concluded apologetically, “[i]f I was
wrong . . . I was wrong because I was bound by circuit precedent and I’m sorry.” Id.
150 Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1146.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
147
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the goals requested by [Luke’s] parents,” except that it proposed placement
in the public school rather than at BHS.154 Luke’s parents rejected the IEP.155
Then-Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch156 wrote for a unanimous
panel, reversing the District Court’s finding that Luke had been denied a
FAPE.157 While it was “sympathetic to Luke’s parents’ desire to see their
child thrive,” the Tenth Circuit nonetheless was “constrained to reverse”
because, in the Court’s view, Rowley required only that an IEP be reasonably
calculated to confer “some educational benefit,” which must simply be
“more than de minimis.”158 Accordingly, “[b]ecause every factfinder to have
assessed [the] case ha[d] found that Luke was making progress in the public
school,” the Tenth Circuit held that the school district had satisfied its
obligation under the IDEA.159 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit fell squarely in
line with the “some benefit” standard.160 This line of reasoning, however,
soon attracted the Supreme Court’s attention.
IV. THE ENDREW F. DECISION: RAISING THE BAR, BUT HOW HIGH?
A. The Beginning of the End: Endrew F. Goes to Washington
While Rowley interpreted the IDEA as establishing a substantive right
to a “free appropriate public education” for students with disabilities, it did
not endorse any one test for determining “when handicapped children [were]
receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the
[IDEA].”161 But on March 22, 2017—thirty-five years after Rowley—the
Supreme Court squarely addressed this issue in Endrew F. v. Douglas
County School District RE-1.162

154

Id. at 1147.
Id.
156 In 2008, when Thompson was decided, Justice Gorsuch was a judge on the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Carrie Severino, Setting the Record Straight on Gorsuch and
Disabilities, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/sett
ing-record-straight-gorsuch-and-disabilities. On April 10, 2017, Justice Gorsuch was sworn
in as the 113th Justice of the Supreme Court. Robert Barnes & Ashley Parker, Neil M.
Gorsuch Sworn In as 113th Supreme Court Justice, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gorsuch-to-be-sworn-in-to-supremecourt-today-in-two-ceremonies/2017/04/10/9ac361fe-1ddb-11e7-ad74-3a742a6e93a7_story.
html?utm_term=.e95ce162cf4c.
157 Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1155.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1145.
160 See, e.g., O.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 804 F.3d 354, 360 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that
under the “some benefit” standard, “a school provides a FAPE so long as a child receives
some educational benefit, meaning a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial”).
161 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982).
162 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
155
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Petitioner Endrew was diagnosed with autism at the age of two.163 As
a result, Endrew experienced impaired cognitive functioning, reduced social
and communicative skills, and behavioral issues.164 His teachers fondly
described him as having a “sweet disposition,” a child with a sense of humor
who “showed concern for friends.”165 Endrew attended public school in the
Douglas County School District (“Douglas County”) from preschool through
fourth grade, receiving an IEP each year designed to address both his
functional and educational needs.166 Endrew made satisfactory progress
throughout his preschool and kindergarten years, but by second grade his
behavioral issues began to interfere with his educational development.167 In
response, Douglas County incorporated a behavioral intervention plan
(“BIP”) into Endrew’s third-grade IEP, which approximately tripled the
amount of time Endrew spent with a “significant-support-needs” instructor
or paraprofessional aide to thirty-three-and-a-half hours a week.168 Endrew’s
third-grade IEP also incorporated assistance from a mental-health
Despite
these
professional
and
speech-language
therapist.169
implementations, however, Endrew’s behavioral issues continued to affect
his educational development, carrying over into the fourth grade.170
As such, Endrew’s parents understandably became dissatisfied with
their son’s progress during his fourth-grade year.171 Although Endrew had
demonstrated progress towards some of his goals and objectives, he still
“exhibited multiple behaviors that inhibited his ability to access learning in
the classroom.”172 These behaviors included screaming in class, climbing
over classroom furniture and other children, and occasionally running away
from school; he also developed fears of ordinary things such as flies and
public restrooms.173 This behavioral regression ultimately stalled Endrew’s
academic progress.174

163

Id. at 996.
Id.
165 Id.
166 See Brief for Respondent at 8, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15-827) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondent].
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
164
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Endrew’s subsequent IEPs, from his parents’ view, seemed to simply
carry over the same learning objectives from one year to the next, “indicating
that [Endrew] was failing to make meaningful progress toward his aims.”175
Despite Endrew’s proposed fifth-grade IEP calling for an increase in hours
with a “significant-support-needs” instructor and paraprofessional aide, a
new BIP, and potential guidance from an autism specialist,176 Endrew’s
parents still viewed the proposed IEP as “pretty much the same as his past
ones.”177 Endrew’s parents believed that “only a thorough overhaul” of the
school district’s methodology toward Endrew’s behavioral issues could
break his academic stagnation.178 But because Douglas County allegedly
could not provide this for Endrew, his parents withdrew him from the public
school and enrolled him at Firefly Autism House (“Firefly”) in May 2010.179
During his time at Firefly, Endrew fared much better than in public
school.180 The private autism center developed a BIP that identified and
addressed Endrew’s behavioral problems, and consequently, within months
Endrew had made significant strides in his educational progression.181
Despite their child’s evident success at Firefly, Endrew’s parents agreed—
in good faith—to meet again with Douglas County representatives in
November 2010.182 Douglas County presented Endrew with a new IEP, but
Endrew’s parents deemed it no different than the one they had rejected
months earlier.183 Accordingly, Endrew remained enrolled at Firefly.184
Less than two years later, in February 2012, Endrew’s parents filed a
complaint with the Colorado Department of Education requesting tuition
reimbursement for Endrew’s placement at Firefly.185 Endrew’s parents
argued that the IEP proposed by Douglas County was not reasonably
calculated to provide Endrew with an educational benefit, that Endrew in
turn had been denied a FAPE, and that Endrew was therefore entitled to
175

Id.
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 166, at 8.
177 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996.
178 Id.
179 Id.; see also Nic Garcia, Minimum Progress for Students with Disabilities
“Preposterous,” Betsy DeVos Says in Denver, CHALKBEAT (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2017/09/13/minimum-progress-for-students-withdisabilities-preposterous-betsy-devos-says-in-denver. Firefly is a private Denver-based
autism center that specializes in educating children with autism. Id. Tuition at Firefly costs
over seventy-thousand dollars a year, where funding comes primarily from public school
districts, but Medicaid and private insurance carriers also contribute. Id. Only one percent of
Firefly’s funding comes out-of-pocket from families who enroll their children there. Id.
180 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996.
181 Id. at 997.
182 See id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
176
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tuition reimbursement under the IDEA.186 The Administrative Law Judge
disagreed, however, and denied the request for tuition reimbursement.187
Endrew’s parents subsequently filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.188 While acknowledging that Endrew’s
progress under his previous IEPs “did not reveal immense educational
growth,” the District Court nonetheless concluded that Endrew’s “past IEPs
revealed a pattern of some progress on his education and functional goals,
and that [his] proposed IEP for the fifth grade continue[d] that pattern.”189
“[A]lthough this [did] not mean that [Endrew] achieved every objective, or
that he made progress on every goal,” the District Court found, “the evidence
show[ed] that [Endrew] received educational benefit while enrolled in
[public school].”190 In other words, because Endrew’s past IEPs had been
reasonably calculated to enable him to make some progress, the IEP at issue
was therefore reasonably calculated to do the same.191 And this progress,
albeit less than what Endrew’s parents had desired, nonetheless satisfied the
“some benefit” standard adopted from Rowley.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.192 Predicated on Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion in Thompson,193 the Tenth Circuit reinforced the notion
that it “ha[d] long subscribed to the Rowley Court’s ‘some educational
benefit’” definition of a FAPE.194 In conformity with its sister circuits, the
Tenth Circuit interpreted the “some benefit” standard to mean that a child
has received a FAPE when the child’s IEP has been “reasonably calculated
to confer some educational benefit,” and that benefit is “more than de
minimis.”195 Applying the customary “some benefit” standard, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that Endrew had not been denied a FAPE, because his IEP had
been “reasonably calculated to enable [him] to make some progress” toward

186

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997.
Id.
188 Id.
189 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, No. 12-2620, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128659, at *30–32 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014) (emphasis added).
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 Id.
192 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 997.
193 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1340 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“[Endrew’s parents] ask that we now expressly overturn Thompson . . . the case relied on by
the [Administrative Law Judge] and the district court for the ‘some educational benefit’
standard. That we cannot do. We are bound by Thompson.”).
194 Id. at 1338.
195 Id. (emphasis added).
187
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his academic objectives.196 Noting that it was bound by Thompson,197 the
Tenth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that it could not abandon the “some
benefit” standard “absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary
decision by the Supreme Court.”198 In almost prophetic fashion, one year
later the Supreme Court took its first step toward the latter. Indeed, in the
autumn of 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.199
B. Rowley No More: Endrew F. Sets a New Standard
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court handed down perhaps the most
impactful special education decision since Rowley. Writing for the
unanimous Court,200 Chief Justice Roberts opened the opinion in observance
of the “more difficult problem” that Rowley had declined to address thirtyfive years prior: determining at which point students with disabilities have
been provided with sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the IDEA.201
In confronting that problem, the Court explicitly overturned the decision of
the Tenth Circuit—and sunset the “some benefit” standard in the process.202
Addressing Douglas County’s argument that, under Rowley, “an IEP
need not promise any particular level of benefit, so long as it is reasonably
calculated to provide some benefit,” the Court found the school district’s
interpretation of Rowley mistaken.203
First, the Court saw “little
significance” in the language of Rowley requiring states to provide
instruction “reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit,”
because, as the Court noted, Rowley had no reason to articulate anything
more specific.204 Second, the Court observed how Rowley acknowledged the
196 Id. at 1342 (“It is clear . . . that [Endrew was] thriving at Firefly. But it is not [Douglas
County]’s burden to pay for his placement there when [Endrew] was making some progress
under its tutelage. That is all that is required. . . . [The IDEA] calls for the creation of [an
IEP] reasonably calculated to enable the student to make some progress towards the goals
within that program.”).
197 Id. at 1340.
198 Id.
199 Endrew F., 798 F.3d 1329, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 29 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 15827).
200 The decision was technically only 8-0 because Justice Scalia had passed away the
previous year, and Justice Gorsuch had not yet been confirmed at the time of the Court’s
decision. Laura McKenna, How A New Supreme Court Ruling Could Affect Special
Education, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/
03/how-a-new-supreme-court-ruling-could-affect-special-education/520662.
201 See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017); see also
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982) (“The determination of when handicapped
children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the [IDEA]
presents a more difficult problem.”).
202 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
203 Id. at 998.
204 Id. (noting that Rowley involved a child whose academic success clearly demonstrated
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“difficult problem” in determining “when handicapped children [were]
receiving sufficient educational benefits,” but still refused “to establish any
one test for determining the adequacy” of such benefits.205 Combining these
two premises, the Court put the final nail in the coffin:
It would not have been “difficult” for us to say when educational
benefits are sufficient if we had just said that [some] educational
benefit was enough. And it would have been strange to refuse to
set out a test for the adequacy of educational benefits if we had
just done exactly that. We cannot accept [Douglas County’s]
reading of Rowley.206
Accordingly, the Court put to rest the “some benefit” standard, replacing it
with a new, heightened standard.207 Today, a school satisfies its obligation
under the IDEA when it provides an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to
enable [the] child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.”208 And as ambiguous as this new standard may sound, the
Court described it as “markedly more demanding” than the “some benefit”
standard applied by the Tenth Circuit.209 “The IDEA,” the Court held,
“demands more.”210 Just how much more, however, remains subject to
interpretation.
C. Deciphering Endrew F.: What it Means, and What it Does Not
Justice Alito foreshadowed the difficulty of crafting an opinion “that
ha[d] just the right nuance to express” how much should be demanded of
public schools.211 To be clear, however, Endrew F.’s reasoning was sound.
Indeed, it would have made little sense for Rowley to explicitly refuse to say
when educational benefits were sufficient if it had intended for any benefit—
“some benefit”—to satisfy the IDEA’s substantive requirement. But as is
oftentimes the issue, the problem hinges on interpretation of the text—and
Nietzsche famously cautioned against letting text disappear under
interpretation.212

that her IEP was reasonably calculated to provide sufficient educational benefits, and
therefore, Rowley was not concerned with establishing a workable standard for closer cases).
205 Id. (emphasis in original).
206 Id.
207 See generally id.
208 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 (emphasis added).
209 Id. at 1000.
210 Id. at 1001.
211 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 47.
212 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE
FUTURE 37 (Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Judith Norman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
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1. What Endrew F. Said
By describing the new standard as “markedly more demanding” than
the “some benefit” standard, the Supreme Court evidently raised the bar for
the level of educational benefit that public schools must provide to students
with disabilities.213 Moreover, because Endrew F.’s standard is “markedly”
more demanding than the “some-benefit” standard,214 there are questions as
to whether Endrew F. also raised the “meaningful benefit” standard
previously used by federal circuits. Indeed, courts and scholars alike have
questioned whether there was even a difference between the “meaningful
benefit” and “some benefit” standards to begin with.215
Furthermore, the Court’s opinion did not once mention the “meaningful
benefit” standard, nor did it use the modifier “meaningful” to describe any
part of the new standard.216 This may suggest that the Court did not choose
between the “some benefit” and “meaningful benefit” standards, but rather
charted a new, heightened standard. And to be sure, this problem of
interpretation has already posed issues for lower courts. For example, in
light of the Tenth Circuit being overruled, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that it too would have to raise its standard to align with Endrew F.217 On the
other hand, some courts that used the “meaningful benefit” standard have
interpreted Endrew F. as simply confirming that standard.218 And other
courts have simply been unsure of the decision’s impact.219
213

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
Id.
215 Compare Kaufman & Blewett, supra note 118, at 20–21 (noting that it is impossible
to be sure whether these two different standards result in drastically different outcomes for
cases in circuits using different standards), with Scott F. Johnson, Rowley Forever More? A
Call for Clarity and Change, 41 J. L. & EDUC. 25, 27 (2012) (“Using one standard or the other
can dramatically affect the outcome of a case and the services provided to a student.”); see
also Systema v. Acad. Sch. Dist., 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Admittedly, it
is difficult to distinguish between the requirements of the ‘some benefit’ and the ‘meaningful
benefit’ standards.”).
216 See generally Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988.
217 M.L. v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our prior FAPE standard is similar
to that of the Tenth Circuit, which was overturned by Endrew F. We have cited to the Tenth
Circuit’s standard in the past, including that court’s decision in Endrew F. itself.”).
218 K.D. v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., No. 16-0165, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141428,
at *19 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2017) (“According to the School District, Endrew F. simply
confirms the standard that has been used in the Third Circuit for years. . . . I agree with the
School District. . . . The [Supreme] Court rejected an interpretation that Rowley’s ‘some
educational benefit’ means only ‘some’ benefit or a benefit that is ‘merely . . . more than de
minimis.’”); see also Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s standard, not ours. On the
contrary, Endrew F.’s language parallels that of our precedents.”).
219 J.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 690 F. App’x 53, 55 n.2 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“Because we conclude that the School District failed to provide [plaintiff] with a free and
appropriate public education under the existing precedent in this circuit, we need not decide
214

MORGAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

3/4/2019 6:52 PM

COMMENT

801

2. What Endrew F. Did Not Say
In analyzing what Endrew F. actually said, it may also be helpful to
explain what it did not. Perhaps most significantly, the Court explicitly
declined to adopt the view held by Endrew’s parents.220 Endrew’s parents
argued that the IDEA required “an education that aims to provide a child
with a disability opportunit[ies] . . . that are substantially equal to the
opportunities afforded [to] children without disabilities.”221 In response, the
Court explained that this standard was “strikingly similar” to the one plainly
rejected in Rowley as “entirely unworkable.”222 Accordingly, the Court
refused “to interpret the FAPE provision in a manner so plainly at odds with
[Rowley].”223
More instructive was the Court’s meet-me-halfway approach to the
Department of Justice, which appeared as amicus curiae in support of
Endrew’s parents.224 During oral argument, Irving “Irv” Gornstein,
Counselor to the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice, argued on
behalf of Endrew’s parents that a FAPE should require “a program that is
aimed at significant educational progress in light of the child’s
circumstances.”225 When asked by Justice Sotomayor if “meaningful” could
replace “significant,” Mr. Gornstein responded that he interpreted
“‘significant’ [as] synonymous with ‘meaningful.’”226 But Mr. Gornstein
also cautioned that the word “meaningful” carried what he described as
“baggage”—interpretational ambiguity—in various federal circuits.227
Accordingly, he tried to steer the Court away from “meaningful” and more
toward “appropriate.”228 As such, Mr. Gornstein proposed the following
language: “reasonably calculated to make progress that is appropriate in light

whether Endrew F. raised the bar for a free and appropriate public education or left Second
Circuit precedent intact (the Supreme Court’s decision certainly did not reduce the force of
the requirement).”).
220 See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
221 Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 40, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15-827)
(emphasis added)).
222 Id. (“This standard is strikingly similar to the one the lower courts adopted in Rowley,
and it is virtually identical to the formulation advanced by Justice Blackmun in his
[concurrence] in that case. . . . But the majority rejected any such standard in clear terms.”).
223 Id. (“The requirement that States provide ‘equal’ educational opportunities would . . .
seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and
comparisons.”).
224 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 19.
225 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
226 Id.
227 Id. at 21.
228 Id. (“The only [word] I would urge you away from actually is ‘meaningful.’ And the
reason is that it has baggage in various courts of appeals. It means different things to different
courts, and it has been applied in different ways by different courts.”).
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of the child’s circumstances.”229 The Court clearly took solace in that
formulation, seemingly as a midpoint between Douglas County’s “some
benefit” standard and Endrew’s parents’ “substantially equal” standard.
Indeed, the standard articulated in Endrew F. is almost verbatim the one
proposed by Mr. Gornstein: “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”230
In choosing this particular language, the Court understood that
“appropriate” progress would differ depending on the child at issue.231 The
Court even refused to “elaborate on what ‘appropriate’ would look like from
case to case,” because as it correctly foresaw, “[t]he adequacy of a given IEP
turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created.”232
Indeed, the creation of an IEP requires forward-thinking decisions by both
school officials and parents—oftentimes a heavily fact-intensive task. And
this might be why the Court replaced a bright-line “some benefit” rule with
a fact-intensive “appropriateness” one.
But therein may lie the problem. By crafting a highly fact-intensive
solution to a problem that is, in itself, highly fact-intensive, the Court perhaps
generated too much room for interpretation among parents, school districts,
hearing officers, lawyers, and ultimately, judges. These uncertainties will
likely impose real costs for struggling school districts, both in pre-planning
and risk management, as well as defending against litigation. Indeed, Justice
Breyer’s fear may very well prove true, in that “the money that ought to go
to the children [will be spent] on lawsuits and lawyers and all kinds of things
that are extraneous.”233
Of course, there are two sides to every story. While the “some benefit”
bright-line standard may have offered greater predictability for parents and
school districts, it was much more susceptible to abuse by the latter. This
was one concern of Endrew F.234 But even so, it might be unfair to broadly
accuse school districts of not fulfilling their IDEA obligations because they
want to cut costs. In a perfect world, public schools would be generously
funded and never have to implement cost-saving measures. Needless to say,
however, this world is far from perfect.
Public school funding,
unfortunately, is a zero-sum game. The more funding consumed by one
curriculum, the less funding remains for the others. In practice, then, if more

229

Id. at 24.
Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
231 Id. at 1001.
232 Id.
233 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 15.
234 See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (“For children with disabilities, receiving instruction
that aims so low would be tantamount to ‘sitting idly . . . awaiting the time when they were
old enough to “drop out.”’”) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982)).
230
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money must be set aside for special education services—particularly to
defend against accompanying litigation—then less money is available for the
general curriculum. And that is precisely the issue facing many struggling
school districts.
V. HOW ENDREW F. COULD AFFECT STRUGGLING SCHOOL DISTRICTS
A. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly—Minus the Good
The IDEA has grown into the second largest federal program in
education, providing states with roughly twelve billion dollars a year to help
alleviate the costs of the six-and-a-half million students with disabilities in
the United States.235 Recognizing the financial strain the IDEA would pose
to school districts, Congress agreed when enacting the statute to cover forty
percent of the additional costs of educating students with disabilities.236 But
as this Comment has previously highlighted,237 Congress has all but
abandoned that agreement. In fact, Congress has never fully funded the
program, routinely covering less than twenty percent of the costs.238 For the
fiscal year of 2017, for example, federal funding covered only sixteen
percent of the excess costs of educating students with disabilities.239 That is
less than the seventeen percent covered in 2008, and much less than the
thirty-three percent covered in 2009, which was inflated by the additional
funding provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.240 In
turn, this deficiency has been assumed by states, and more directly, by local
school districts—many of which struggle to offset the deficit because their
local funding pool is simply impoverished.
And that is precisely the burden Endrew F. may inadvertently pose for
struggling school districts. Because Endrew F. seemingly raised the
standard by a substantial degree, and federal funding is consistently
inadequate, then more money will likely have to be expended on special
education for school districts to avoid liability under Endrew F. This may
create serious difficulties for school districts where an impoverished local
property tax base supports most of the educational funding. Generally
speaking, local governments collect local taxes from residential and
commercial properties, and then funnel that revenue into school districts as

235

BLACK, supra note 21, at 472.
Id.
237 See supra Part II.C.
238 Id.
239 See FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 108, at 4.
240 “Full Funding” Debate, NEW AM.: EDUC. POL’Y, https://www.newamerica.org/educat
ion-policy/topics/school-funding-and-resources/students-disabilities/federal-funding/fullfunding-debate/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
236
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their main source of funding.241 In this system, wealthier localities have the
ability to raise more money through higher property taxes, creating an
abundance in resources that allows those wealthier localities to provide
sufficient funding for their public schools. Poorer localities, however, do not
fare as well. Impoverished school districts usually have reduced tax bases,
which generate less funding to support their public schools.242 This means
that disabled students who live in impoverished localities often attend
schools with fewer resources, fewer qualified teachers, substandard school
facilities, and diminished funding to rectify these issues.243 If and when these
schools struggle to satisfy their obligations under Endrew F., financial
liability attaches, which in turn exacerbates the overarching problem. A
cycle develops that proliferates to its own detriment.
Furthermore, any time the federal education budget is reduced, the
IDEA nonetheless prohibits cuts to special education programs due to its
“maintenance of effort” clause.244 Scholars have criticized the IDEA’s
“maintenance of effort” clause as benefiting neither taxpayers nor
students.245 The clause effectively prevents states from reducing special
education funding below the preceding fiscal year.246 In practice, then, if
schools must reduce their education budgets (as is sometimes necessary), the
IDEA prohibits cuts to the special education program.247 Accordingly,
school districts may be forced to increase class sizes, lay off teachers,
counselors, and nurses, or reduce enrichment programs in order to satisfy
their obligations under Endrew F.248
In addition, cuts to Medicaid could create a similar problem. Medicaid
reimbursements constitute the third-largest federal source of funding to
public schools.249 Special education in particular relies heavily on Medicaid,
241 See Alana Semuels, Good School, Rich School; Bad School, Poor School, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/property-taxes-andunequal-schools/497333/.
242 See id.
243 Id.
244 20 U.S.C § 1412(a)(18)(A) (2012).
245 See, e.g., Nathan Levenson, Boosting the Equality and Efficiency of Special Education,
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. 32 (Sept. 2012), http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/public
ation/pdfs/20120905BoostingtheQualityandEfficiencyofSpecialEducation20120905Boostin
gtheQualityandEfficiencyofSpecialEducationFinal_.pdf (“[The ‘maintenance of effort’]
provision says, in essence, that considerations of cost effectiveness have no place in special
education. It serves neither the needs of students nor the interests of taxpayers very well.”).
246 BLACK, supra note 21, at 472.
247 Id.
248 See Jonah Edelman, Trump’s Budget Fails to Put America’s Children First, HILL
(Mar. 15, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/education/324128-trumps-budgetfails-to-put-americas-children-first.
249 Emma Brown, GOP Health-Care Bill Could Cut Funds Schools Use to Help SpecialEd Students, WASH. POST (June 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education
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but congressional proposals could trigger major cuts to the federal assistance
program.250 The federal government subsidizes via Medicaid some of the
expensive, but important therapies provided to students with disabilities,
such as mental health therapy, speech therapy, and physical therapy, as well
as equipment ranging from hearing aids to breathing and mobility
apparatuses, and even specialized transportation.251
If that money
disappears, the burden again falls on the states and, more specifically, local
school districts. This would impact not only the special education
curriculum, but the general education curriculum too, because the general
education budget will likely have to offset any loss of subsidies to the special
education budget.252 When the average per capita spending on special
education students is twice the average per capita spending on general
education students,253 this counterbalance becomes particularly difficult to
achieve for school districts already struggling to keep their heads above
water.
B. Two Birds, One Stone: How to Protect Both the Children and School
Districts
All methods of problem-solving can be broken down into a simple, twostep process. The first step is to recognize there is a problem. The second
step is to try to solve it. While this Comment has highlighted the problem
Endrew F. may pose for struggling school districts, there may also be some
solutions to help alleviate these concerns. For one, Congress could limit the
amount of tuition reimbursement that parents may recover from public
schools after unilaterally placing their children in private
programs.254 Described by some legal professionals as a “disabilities
reimbursement reform,” such a cap on tuition reimbursement could be based
/gop-health-care-bill-could-strip-public-schools-of-billions-for-special-education/2017/06/2
7/05650ad4-5aa5-11e7-a9f6-7c3296387341_story.html?utm_ term=.a295626855a!.
250 Damian Paletta & Eric Werner, White House Budget Proposes Increase to Defense
Spending and Cuts to Safety Net, but Federal Deficit Would Remain, WASH. POST (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/white-house-budget-proposesincrease-to-defense-spending-and-cuts-to-safety-net-but-federal-deficit-would-remain/2018/
02/12/f2eb00e6-100e-11e8-8ea1-c1d91fcec3fe_story.html?utm_term=.dd60904c9c85; see
also Jennifer Steinhauer, Republicans Look to Safety Net Programs as Deficit Balloons, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/26/us/politics/medicare-medicaidsocial-security-republicans-elections.html.
251 See Why Schools Are Worried About Medicaid Cuts Hurting Special Education, PBS:
NEWS HOUR (May 22, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/schools-worriedmedicaid-cuts-hurting-special-education#transcript.
252 BLACK, supra note 21, at 471.
253 Id.
254 Kathleen Conn, Solving the Funding Problem After Endrew F. Decision, KING, SPRY,
HERMAN, FREUND & FAUL (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.kingspry.com/solving-the-fundingproblem-after-endrew-f-decision/.
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on a percentage of the costs of the particular private placement.255
Alternatively, reimbursement for private tuition could be subsidized as a
percentage of parental income, similar to how public schools implement
free-and-reduced lunch programs.256 In any event, a statutory limit on tuition
reimbursement may encourage parents to better cooperate with school
districts, while at the very least discourage hastily-brought lawsuits.257
Finally, such a cap would allow schools to fashion their budgets more
effectively, as they would be on notice as to the amount of tuition
reimbursement for which they may be liable, based on the number of IDEAeligible students within the district.258
Most importantly, however, these solutions would help protect both
students with disabilities and school districts. On the one hand, students with
disabilities would benefit from Endrew F.’s heightened educational
standard, and their parents would still be able to seek tuition reimbursement
if that standard is not met. On the other hand, school districts would benefit
from a statutory cap on tuition reimbursement that both limits their liability
and allows them to better incorporate these liabilities into their budgets. Two
birds, one stone.
VI. CONCLUSION
Endrew F. has become the newest champion of students with
disabilities, rightfully assuming its place atop the mantle of special education
law. As such, some may find it unjustified to question Endrew F.’s good
intentions—and understandably so. Some may think the finger should
instead be pointed at Capitol Hill, since it is Congress that has openly
abandoned its financial obligation under the IDEA. And those criticisms
might be valid, in a vacuum. But the public education system does not exist
in a vacuum. Insufficient funding has plagued struggling school districts long
before Endrew F., and will continue to do so long afterward. Perhaps, then,
the decision just becomes the straw that breaks the camel’s back. Indeed,
only time will tell whether Endrew F. creates more problems than it solves.
For the sake of students with disabilities, we should hope not.

255
256
257
258

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

